Wednesday, August 23, 2006

Politica estera Bush rafforza Iran in Medio Oriente

(Source: ANSA)
Chatham House: 'Ora e' Stato piu' influente in Medioriente' (ANSA) - LONDRA, 23 AGO - La guerra degli Stati Uniti contro il terrorismo avrebbe rafforzato l'Iran in Medio oriente. Lo sostiene un rapporto della Chatham House. Per l'Istituto internazionale, la politica estera Usa ha eliminato 'due governi rivali dell'Iran, Taleban in Afghanistan e Saddam Hussein in Iraq, senza sostituirli con strutture politiche coerenti'. Cosi' il Paese di Ahmadinejad e' diventato la potenza piu' 'influente per ragioni politiche, economiche, culturali, religiose e militari' in Medio Oriente.
Rapporto della Chatham House: link.
Presentazione rapporto:
Iran’s regional position is key to its strength
(Wednesday 23 August 2006)

Key messages:
- The 'war on terror' removed the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, Iran's two greatest regional rivals, and strengthened Iran’s regional leverage in doing so;
- Israel's failure to defeat Hizbullah has reinforced Iran's position as the region's focal point against US-led policy;
- If seriously threatened, Iran has the potential to inflame the region yet further;
- A US-sponsored military strike would be devastating for Iran, the Persian Gulf region and beyond;

Iran's influence in Iraq has superseded that of the US, and it is increasingly rivalling the US as the main actor at the crossroads between the Middle East and Asia. Its role within other war- torn areas such as Afghanistan and southern Lebanon has now increased hugely. This is compounded by the failure of the US and its allies to appreciate the extent of Iran’s regional relationships and standing - a dynamic which is the key to understanding Iran’s newly found confidence and belligerence towards the West. As a result, the US-driven agenda for confronting Iran is severely compromised by the confident ease with which Iran sits in its region. This is the key finding of Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crises, a major new report published by Chatham House.
The report also looks into the ideology of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and unpicks Iran’s complicated power structure. It claims that despite his popularity, Ahmadinejad neither holds an insurmountable position within Iran nor commands universal support for his outspoken foreign policy positions. The paper outlines the friction between Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, with the former increasingly trying to wrest control of foreign policy away from the extreme positions of Ahmadinejad and his hardline supporters.
On hostility with the US, the report argues that while the US may have the upper hand in ‘hard’ power projection, Iran has proved far more effective through its use of ‘soft' power. According to the report, the Bush administration has shown little ability to use politics and culture to pursue its strategic interests while Iran’s knowledge of the region, its fluency in the languages and culture, strong historical ties and administrative skills have given it a strong advantage over the West. The report also holds a cautious view of the Iran-Israel relationship. It outlines four future scenarios for the relationship between the two states, one of which is the creation of a ‘cold-war’ style nuclear stand-off should Iran achieve nuclear capability.
Dr Claire Spencer, Head, Middle East Programme said 'Iran's intricate relationships with other states in the region, as well as a number of sub-state actors within these countries, have put it in a remarkably flexible position from which to defend its interests'
Dr Ali Ansari, Associate Fellow, Middle East Programme, said: 'Western policy towards the Middle East shows a complete lack of imagination. There is a world of opportunities between neglect and military action which has yet to be fully explored.'
Nadim Shehadi, Associate Fellow, Middle East Programme, said: 'While the US has been playing poker in the region, Iran has been playing chess. Iran is playing a longer, more clever game and has been far more successful at winning hearts and minds.'
In the widest-ranging report of its kind, Iran’s position in relation to all of the players in the Middle East and Asian regions is analyzed, with sections on Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, the GCC states, Turkey, Russia and the former Soviet states, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China and Japan.

Saturday, August 05, 2006

The wolves' howl

Mentre l'attenzione dei media è immancabilmente rivolta alla guerra in Libano, gli osservatori occidentali farebbero meglio a sottolineare gli ultimi sviluppi politici nel Caucaso, una regione magmatica sempre in movimento.
Gli ultimi mesi sono stati contraddistinti da una recrudescenza della tensione in Georgia tra Tbilisi e Suhumi (=Mosca), circa il destino della regione georgiana separatista dell'Abkhazia, sostenuto da Mosca. Sulla questione abkhaza, di cui già vi ho parlato, sembra difficile arrivare a una soluzione. Trovo più che legittime le posizioni georgiane: quello che si ebbe a inizio anni '90 fu una documentata pulizia etnica contro i georgiani (che erano maggioranza nella regione abkhaza), anche se alimentata dal tono nazionalista dell'allore Presidente Gamsakhurdia. Da quando l'Abkhazia riuscì a raggiungere l'indipendenza de facto (di cui storicamente non aveva mai goduto), Mosca ha sempre giocato questa partita come ricatto verso Tbilisi, riuscendo a tenere in scacco a più riprese la piccola repubblica caucasica. Intanto Sakaashvili, che già è riuscito egregiamente a riportare l'Adjaria (altra regione autonomista georgiana) sotto il controllo della capitale, ha promesso di non accettare soluzioni che portino all'indipendenza dell'Abkhazia.
Per quel che riguarda il Caucaso Settentrionale, la guerra ormai è dappertutto. E, se l'estate era cominciata con pesanti perdite nel fronte ceceno (la morte di Sadullaev e l'uccisione, importantissima, di Shamil Basaev), ora è il momento delle truppe federali. Nelle ultime settimane si sono registrate più di una dozzina di scontri con bilanci clamorosi (10-12 soldati russi a terra per azione), non solo in Cecenia, ma anche in Dagestan. Ciò sembra ricalcare l'ormai collaudato schema tattico: dopo il letargo invernale, i lupi subiscono qualche colpo spesso a causa di tradimenti, sviste o piani dei servizi di sicurezza federali elaborati durante l'inverno. Dopo questo esordio amaro primaverile, l'estate è sempre stato il momento in cui la guerriglia ha pestato più duro e premuto più a lungo il grilletto. Speriamo che non si rispetti questo schema fino al tragico finale autunnale: un violento atto di terrorismo o l'occupazione in forza di una città.
Ciò che conta sottolineare, è che la morte di Sadualev e quella di Basaev sono ben lungi dall'aver indebolito il fronte caucasico. Paradossalmente la morte di Basaev può anche aver tolto le castagne dal fuoco a diversi insorgenti. La scomparsa dei leader ceceni (dal 1999 quasi non si conta il numero di leader uccisi) non deve portare a erronee valutazioni. La guerriglia cecena è una macchina in grado di riprodursi, poichè il combustibile per alimentarla non manca: in uno scenario puramente militare, il potere politico equivale al potere militare, chi non ha quest'ultimo difficilmente ha un qualche peso nelle strutture politiche ceceno/caucasiche. E il popolo ceceno è un popolo tradizionalmente abituato a vivere in un contesto di autodifesa. Nel Caucaso le armi non mancano, nè arditi in grado di maneggiarle bene. L'origine delle armi va ricercata nei contrabbandieri (spesso militari) russi.
Dopo l'assassinio del Presidente Sadulaev, è stato nominato presidente Doku Umarov, un radicale non wahhabita che già nel '97 era stato al fianco di Maskhadov e che negli ultimi anni aveva rivestito il ruolo di segretario del Consiglio di Sicurezza Nazionale ceceno. Per ora il Presidente Umarov non ha apportato cambiamenti alla struttura politica della CRI nè rimpasti in seno al governo, ribadendo però l'impegno a continuare la resistenza fino alla ritirata delle truppe russe dalla Cecenia.
Riporto qui sotto un'interessantissima intervista rilasciata un anno fa dall'allora comandante del fronte ceceno occidentale Umarov al giornalista russo e dissidente Andrej Babitski, noto per i suoi canali preferenziali di contatto con la guerriglia. L'intervista data Thursday, July 28, 2005.
Interview with chechen field commander Doku Umarov
(by Andrej Babitski)
In mid-June, RFE/RL correspondent Andrei Babitskii traveled to Chechnya where he established contact with field commander Doku Umarov, one of only two commanders who have fought with the Chechen resistance since 1995, throughout both wars. Following the Khasavyurt accord that ended the first Chechen war in 1996 and the election of Aslan Maskhadov as president in January 1997, Umarov was named by Maskhadov to head the Chechen Security Council. In that capacity, he intervened in July 1998 to quash an armed clash between moderates and Islamic radicals within Maskhadov's entourage. During the second war, Umarov has commanded the southwestern front, the region southwest of Grozny that borders on Georgia and Ingushetia. Russian officials have branded Umarov, like other resistance leaders, a "terrorist," but he has unequivocally distanced himself from the terrorist atrocities perpetrated by his fellow field commander Shamil Basaev. Umarov does not, however, refer to Basaev by name anywhere in his interview with Babitskii.

RFE/RL correspondent Andrei Babitskii: The camp where Doku Umarov's small group -- just six men -- is located was nothing more than several tents scattered around a forest and a couple sheets of plastic hanging from tree branches. A stream runs beside a meadow a bit further down the slope, while 200 or 300 meters above the camp looms an almost vertical precipice. It would be a simple matter to break your neck trying to climb down it. The group has been camped here for a few days, preparing supplies and ammunition for a long march. The Chechens spend all their daylight hours waiting for dusk, when they can ascend the mountain and, at a predetermined place, meet with sympathizers who, according to a previously sent list, have collected provisions, medicine, and equipment. I saw dried soups, canned goods, clothing, and little things like a cobbler's needle and synthetic thread. Huge quantities of medicines are brought, since life in the mountains gives rise to numerous illnesses. They are taking pills all the time for every reason. The armed men don't pay any attention to the cloud of midges hanging over the meadow all day, as if they have grown completely accustomed to them. For the last two weeks, it has rained nearly every day. Drops rattle on the plastic sheets with such a deafening sound that you'd think the echo could be heard for hundreds of meters. But that is just an illusion.

The war for you has been going on for six years. Don't you think there is some other way out of the situation?

Doku Umarov: At present, as long as we have not completely liberated ourselves from the boots of Russian soldiers, I do not see any other way out, because now no other possibilities remain. More, after all that Russia, the Russian so-called Army has done in this country, I, for one, do not see any other way out. I think that any honest citizen, any patriot of his people, also sees no way out.

RFE/RL: Doku Umarov, whose nomination as vice president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was confirmed only days before [on 16 June], limps very slightly. After he climbs up or down the mountain, his limp is considerably more noticeable. Recently he stepped on a land mine. Forces loyal to pro-Kremlin Chechen First Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, hearing of this, announced that Umarov had lost a leg and, together with Russian forces, organized a huge manhunt in the mountains, thinking that he would be easy to find and catch. However, the vice president's leg is in place and he is eager to show it off, saying that this time the wound healed surprisingly quickly. He is 40 years old, although he looks older because of a wound to the face that he received a few years ago. Plastic surgeons were able to restore the damaged portions of his skull and now he has some almost unnoticeable difficulties with pronunciation and pronounced scars on his lips and chin.

Don't you think that a significant portion of the population doesn't want to live outside of Russia -- I mean, the Chechen population?

Umarov: Of course not. Today, if one can speak without looking back, without being afraid that you might be abducted for speaking, that at any moment one might be subjected to the terror that the Russian Army is committing now -- if you take away that fear, I think that about 1 percent of the Chechen population would say that they don't dream of life without Russia. Earlier, under the Soviet Union, when we were one country, maybe. But now, after six years, I think, there are no such people. Today it is simply because of fear, because of the dead-end situation, and because they don't see any future, that there are people who have lost their faith. And these people, in order to secure themselves, save themselves, talk this way.

RFE/RL: That's what you suppose. I understand that these conclusions are based on suppositions. But nonetheless there hasn't been a referendum, there hasn't been a chance to express what the people really think about this question.

Umarov: I participated in the first war. At that time, as you know, there was an opposition -- [former Checheno-Ingush Obkom First Secretary Doku] Zavgaev or [Grozny Mayor Beslan] Gantamirov, many names and people who considered themselves part of the intelligentsia and who stood on their principles, who really did not envision life either with Russia or without Russia. That is a fact. I know because I was also from a family of the intelligentsia and I know how my father thought. But now that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and his gang -- which he brought in, armed, and let loose -- have come to power, after that, that opposition, that intelligentsia, doesn't think of life with Russia. They only dream of getting rid of Russia, that it would be better to be subjected to anyone else, if only those barbarians were gone. Those people who did not support us during the first war, who were actually ready to stand with weapons against us, those people have preserved their sense that they are ready to lay down their lives for an idea. Now these people are ready to fight against Russia, against these.... I have spoken a lot to these people. These people give us much more support than those people who supported the revolutionary processes, supported our course. But now they are broken by the terror that has been created by the structures of the FSB [Federal Security Service] or the structure of Putin's administration, perhaps. Everything they are doing in Chechnya is done to break the human spirit, to make people lose their humanity. And they are having considerable success with the horrific things they are doing to people. From futility, when a person thinks he has no way out, when a person thinks only about getting enough to eat, when he is placed on the edge of survival, when a person sits and waits for his monthly welfare. And he knows that if they don't give it to him, then he can't buy any bread, if they don't give him his compensation payment, then he won't have a roof over his head. These days you can get people to do or say anything if you have strength, power, and money.

RFE/RL: It doesn't seem to me that there is much hope that the war will end. There is no chance of you winning it as a military conflict. What are you hoping for?

Umarov: We are believers. A person without faith is not a whole person. We are on Allah's path; it is a sacred path for us. So we are obligated to perform the jihad. Today there is a superpower that the entire world believes cannot be defeated militarily -- that idea also needs to be analyzed. But until there is a regime change [in Russia], until sensible people come to power, until then there will not be an end to the war. But there is no such thing as dead-end situation. Our situation is not as bad as some people think. Our situation would be bad if it was 2000 and the rule of Putin was just beginning. But I think that the times are changing, that every rule comes to an end, and that his epoch is ending, sensible people will come to power. Such a regime, such an empire sooner or later must come to its end. But to stop now, to bow down and live with those people is practically impossible. No self-respecting person could do it. Those people who are afraid, who don't have the force of will to proceed down the road of freedom for their people, that person -- if he respects himself -- cannot live with those people. Because they leave him no dignity.

RFE/RL: Umarov is not a Wahhabi -- that is known in Chechnya. He practices traditional Islam, although he doesn't deny the right of existence to the form of radical Islam widely known as Wahhabism. Within the armed underground, a new situation is emerging. While previously Wahhabis formed separate detachments and fought separately from Chechens who practice traditional confessions, now they are all mixed together. In one group you can find people of all different faiths and this no longer leads to conflicts as it did before when the radicals tried to convince the traditionalists that they were infidels. This somehow seems to contradict the widespread notion that all those in Chechnya who are fighting against Russia are practitioners of radical Islam.

How correct is it to say that in the forests there are no longer any people who are not motivated by radical Islam, who are not trying to establish a Shari'a-based state, a Shari'a-based legal system, who reject the traditional Chechen way of life?

Umarov: That is an FSB fantasy. Ideological work has come to the forefront during this war. This is the ignorant thinking of Kadyrov's clan, because Kadyrov considered himself a traditional Muslim. A Muslim, any Muslim, any person must live according to some law. And if a Muslim lives according to Shari'a, then Shari'a forbids him from goofing around or smoking or doing such things, then I consider that good. But I, for example, came to this war as a patriot. The switch to war happened in Moscow and when the occupation began, I understood that war was inevitable and I arrived as a patriot. Maybe at that time I didn't know how to pray, I don't remember. Now, they say I am a Wahhabi or a follower of radical Islam. That is laughable. I have a whole front. I go along that front and I don't see people fighting to bring to the world Wahhabism or terror. The whole world is just clinging to those two words.

RFE/RL: Let's talk about terrorism. Your commander Shamil Basaev planned and carried out several terrorist acts. To justify himself, he wrote in one letter that Allah gives one the right to take away from someone what he has taken from you.

Umarov: In any case, we do not have that right today. If we were to use those methods, then I think not one of us would be able to return as normal humans.

RFE/RL: There were terrorist acts in Beslan, in Moscow, and the responsibility for that blood lies both with the Russian authorities and with the entire Chechen resistance. Does that mean that such acts have been acknowledged, have been granted moral legitimacy by the Chechen resistance?
Umarov: No, in the eyes of the resistance such operations have no legitimacy. We ourselves were horrified by what they did in Beslan. Because we know the concrete facts of what our people hoped for, how it all began.

RFE/RL: Well, no matter what they hoped for, it is obvious that kidnapping children means putting their lives in great danger.

Umarov: That is a fact. Definitely, if one knows what to expect from the Kremlin. I, for example, knowing Putin, knowing his team -- it is a fact that on the first day one could have expected that this would be an enormous threat for the children. And that's how it turned out, that's how the operation ended up.

RFE/RL: The new president and vice president of the Republic of Chechnya-Ichkeria, Abdul-Khamid Sadullaev and Doku Umarov, intend to follow the policy of [slain President] Aslan Maskhadov, who condemned terrorism and called on Russia to negotiate. However, Shamil Basaev, who organized several terrorist acts on Russian territory, occupies an official post in the leadership of the Chechen resistance, and, just as Maskhadov did, Sadullaev and Umarov consider Basaev a comrade in arms. A situation in which the opposition has, even if only conditionally, some sort of distinct center creates the hope for negotiations at some point in the unforeseeable future. Doku Umarov has been accused many times of being involved in kidnappings during the period between the wars. I asked him about this. Of course, his answer couldn't dispel all doubts and it is necessary to return to this topic -- he will be asked about it many times and he will have to answer to even more serious charges.
In the period between the wars, this place was governed by banditry. Various groups kidnapped people and introduced slavery into everyday life. How do you assess that period? As far as I understand, such charges have been leveled against you.

Umarov: I was secretary of the Security Council and I had to constantly -- in order to avoid a civil conflict, like the one that happened in [July 1998 in] Gudermes -- I therefore had to constantly deal with [field commander Arbi] Baraev and [field commander Ramzan] Akhmadov, with the Ingushetians, and with [former Ingushetian President Ruslan] Aushev. Maskhadov sent me everywhere. Because of these contacts, I began to be accused of this. But I always -- when these accusations reached this level, when Maskhadov said at the Security Council that I had been accused -- I said, "Here is my statement, but a person's guilt can only be established in court. If I am guilty, I will not lift a finger to defend myself. Prove it and that's all But what people say -- that is slander, and it isn't for me. Just give me a fact. Without facts, a person can say, looking at a horse, "there is a goat." Kidnappings, chaos -- all that happened. But you look around today -- those people who flourished in the slave trade -- where are they now? The main bandit, Movladi Baisarov -- where is Baisarov today? Where is Yamadaev, where is his deputy today? [Editor's note: There were seven Yamadaev brothers, and it is not 100 percent clear from this context which one Umarov was referring to, but he probably had in mind Ruslan Yamadaev, who now represents Chechnya in the Russian State Duma.] You say "slavery" in reproach, but things never got to the point where people were selling corpses. And now, when there are 100,000 Russian troops here, they are selling corpses. And they are stealing so that they can murder and sell the corpse. That is the scale of what is happening.

RFE/RL: In November there are supposed to be elections to the Chechen legislature. Do you think that this will lead to yet another quasi-governmental structure or can it be an authoritative organ of power?

Umarov: No self-respecting person will participate in these elections. They won't vote and they won't run. This will be yet another structure that will sit at the Kremlin's trough, a simple fiction. Although, perhaps, because of competition among themselves for these positions, they will create an appearance, they will create the impression that they have formed parties for these elections.
RFE/RL: I was really surprised how freely, without looking around, without taking any apparent precautions, the Chechen fighters moved through the forest. Two years ago when I was here, the atmosphere was completely different. Every second the Chechens expected an attack, prepared for them for days on end. There were trenches and lookouts guarding the camps around the clock in any weather. Now there is nothing like that. It seems more like an encampment of hunters taking a break. Only the distant roar of reconnaissance planes remind one that a war is going on. "Now we move around relatively freely," Umarov told me. It often happens that two groups -- Russian and Chechen -- will encounter one another in the forest and move away without engaging. No one needs extra casualties.
Ramzan Kadyrov says that sooner or later he will cope with the resistance. Is it true that the actions of his forces have been as successful as he says?

Umarov: His masters in the Kremlin keep summoning him and saying: "Come on, let's put down our weapons and take up shovels. There are no results from you, from your army. You are just spreading drugs and terror among the people." And every time the masters pull his strings, he shows up with 100 mujahedin who have surrendered, a bunch of captured weapons, several of Basaev's arms, and some of Umarov's left legs.

RFE/RL: Nonetheless, it remains a fact that after all these years of fighting, the federal forces and Kadyrov's units have managed to liquidate a significant portion of the old command group.
Umarov: That is life. Tomorrow, I might be gone. That is life -- we are not immortal, we are not gods. Life goes on. We are old and have to give up our places. There are several young people climbing up toward each of our places and waiting for their turns to take these places. There is no such thing as war without loss. So, Maskhadov and others have left on the road to Allah. Sadullaev took Maskhadov's place. He's 38, young, smart, and full of energy. Tomorrow, perhaps, one of these young people might take my place. Someone might come along who will be even better than I am. But by comparison now, what is the difference, what has been broken? The losses have been big. In general, before Maskhadov's death, I didn't really notice them, but simply the death of Maskhadov was a great loss. But for every commander who has died, someone has appeared immediately -- maybe I'm not being fair to the dead -- who was young and energetic and who made you forget the loss. You don't forget, of course, your brothers, your friends, that they existed. But their places have been taken by eager, energetic people.

RFE/RL: In general, if you compare things with the first years of the war or the situation as it develops from year to year, is there a kind of dynamic, an order to the development of the mood of the entire conflict?

Umarov: At first, if you analyze things, on some level, on the level of ideas it was as if they were establishing order or taking revenge for the offended honor of Russia. Or it was clear that they were carrying out some sort of ideological program because of the abductions of people, the cut-off fingers. In his soul, every Russian soldier felt responsibility. Now there is none of that. It has been lost. Now the majority -- because they don't extend the contracts, because they don't pay what they owe-- they have to bring in against their will.

RFE/RL: But all the same, precautions must be taken. For example, Chechens in the mountains don't use mobile communications, or they use them only in extreme situations, although everyone carries a phone. As soon as they get into the forest, they pull out the batteries because they believe that even a phone that has been turned off can be listened in on and located. And that location determines within a radius of 20 meters where a call has been placed, and literally within a few minutes there might be an artillery strike. Russian artillery batteries are placed around the republic in such a way as to be able to open fire on any position from four separate locations. "Now in Chechnya there is a half moon," one of the Chechens told me. "We move around the forest at night in small groups since the Russian forces have equipment with which they can easily follow our movements." When the moon begins to wane, the small units come together into larger formations.
The fact that Kadyrov's forces are now going after relatives -- does that hold young people back?
Umarov: Actually this has exactly the opposite effect on young people. Now I face this issue myself. This winter, my aunt and my wife's brother went missing. I don't know -- maybe they were killed, maybe they weren't. And two relatives from Itum-Kalinskii Raion. They took someone's wife and six-month baby. They took someone's father or brother. Because they have been taken, I don't see fear, neither in words or conversation. On the contrary, I see aggression. All this is Allah's will and we have to accept it calmly.

RFE/RL: What can you say about the losses suffered by the Russian side and Kadyrov's units?
Umarov: A week ago in the Itum-Kalinskii Raion, one group destroyed two armored personnel carriers and passersby blocked the road. Civilians weren't allowed through. They counted more than 30 bodies. That was a simple diversionary action. We have learned to attack quickly and move on. They are trying to conceal their casualties. One GRU [military-intelligence] group between the villages of Malii Kharsinoi and Staryi Kharsinoi, there are two villages there and we were there recently. One GRU unit had 39 members and we destroyed 38 of them. They one who survived was made a Hero of Russia, but they didn't announce it anywhere. And that, by the way, is the GRU. They collected their weapons, but didn't make any announcement. With Kadyrov's men, it isn't always to hide their losses but just to get rid of a problem. Quick burials and that's it. No one is going to run to local or raion councils and report that someone has died. Among Kadyrov's forces, some, fearing reprisals, maybe they went along for money, even their parents don't try to publicize their losses or keep an accounting. But their losses are greater.

Friday, July 21, 2006

Bielorussia, regolamento di conti dopo le elezioni irregolari

Interessante constatare, giorno dopo giorno, come l'influenza di Mosca produca pericolose aberrazioni liberticide nei paesi in cui si esercita.
Keep on rockin' in a free world
(Source: Eurasia Daily Monitor - Friday, July 21, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 141)
VERDICT HANDED DOWN ON BELARUSIAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
On July 13 a Minsk court sentenced former presidential candidate Alexander Kazulin to five and one-half years of confinement. The verdict, while unwarranted and harsh, also raises some questions about the outlook of the Lukashenka regime. Why was Kazulin singled out for such treatment at a time when 10- or 15-day sentences for petty hooliganism are much more prevalent? (Anatol Lyabedzka recently received such a sentence, and Vintsuk Vyachorka, Syarhey Kalyakin, and others have served similar detentions.) Why would the government make an example of the former Rector of the State University, the ebullient 50-year old Social Democratic leader?Earlier this summer, public concern over Kazulin’s impending trial was reflected in the establishment of a public commission to demand his release, as well as those of other political prisoners. Lawyer Aleh Volchak remarked that the commission was not defending Kazulin personally but was concerned about the principle: that a presidential candidate could be put on trial and that future candidates could not be ensured of immunity to persecution (Belapan, July 5). On July 12, during the trial, Kazulin's wife, Iryna Kazulina, made a personal appeal to President Alexander Lukashenka, in which she pointed out that the president was aware of his rival's intentions to attend the Third All-Belarusian Assembly, held on March 3, and thus consented to the physical assault on Kazulin by Special Forces. She also asked the president to explain his statement alleging that Kazulin had offered to make him a deal prior to the election, a comment that never received further elaboration (Belapan, July 12).When the trial began on July 6, hundreds of people arrived to observe, although most were prevented from attending the ostensibly open process, including two heads of EU diplomatic missions. Judge Alyaksei Rybakou banned the use of cameras, and ordered several photographers to leave the courtroom. At one point someone in the audience laughed and the judge asked everyone to leave the room, including the two EU diplomats. Alexander Milinkevich, the united democratic candidate during the elections, was banned from the proceedings. He commented that the trial was closed because the authorities felt nervous and did not wish to conduct a normal public event (Belorusy i Rynok, July 10). Mikola Statkevich, who has been released temporarily from his detention center in Baranovichi for a period of two weeks, stated that despite well known past political differences with Kazulin, he never confused politics with personal matters. He respects Kazulin for his courage and thus opted to express his civic position in the court of the Moscow district of Minsk (Narodnaya Volya, July 11).On July 13, when Judge Rybakou handed down the sentence, there was widespread shock and consternation. The severity was a result of the judge's adherence to Article 342 of the Belarusian Criminal Code--the organization of group actions disturbing the public peace. The defendant was also convicted of petty hooliganism in reference to the opposition demonstration of March 25, and its attempt to release political prisoners, which ended in a brutal confrontation with the militia. The prosecutor had demanded the maximum allowable: six years. The opposition condemned the sentence, as did the United States--which promptly added the judge and prosecutor to the list of Belarusian officials banned from entering the United States -- and the European Union. A statement by the United Civic Party added that Kazulin's conviction was a consequence of his courage to speak the truth about the regime in public, a reference to the candidate's television interviews, that had caused a sensation in Minsk and other cities (Charter 97, July 17).The conditions in which the trial was held bordered on the inhumane. Kazulin was denied medical attention and at one point was obliged to lie down on the bench. The trial also coincided with a curious rumor campaign, after people posing as KGB officers and Belarusian patriots dispatched an e-mail to several sources that declared the president had suffered two strokes in the immediate aftermath of the election campaign and in mid-June during meetings with Gazprom about gas prices. It suggested that various rivals were now struggling to take over Lukashenka's power base and forming a special squad to attack the president's opponents. This same e-mail divulged that Lukashenka regarded Kazulin, rather than Milinkevich, as his main adversary (Belapan, July 11).Whatever the validity of the e-mail, it offered one explanation for such an outlandish court sentence. Kazulin has long had close links to state structures, he has influential contacts in Russia, and his election tactics were notably confrontational and personal (regarding Lukashenka's private life in particular). He is articulate and personable, and to the presidential administration there is little doubt that he is more feared than other opposition leaders. Lyabedzka and Vyachorka are familiar foes and can be predicted to act according to democratic norms; the same applies to Milinkevich, who is essentially a political outsider who needs to penetrate the mainstream electorate and is better known outside the country than within.Thus either the president or his associates fear Kazulin. While such apprehension might seem illogical to an outsider, Kazulin's influence and popularity in Minsk are only too evident, and they are not reflected in his official election returns. Just as Lukashenka had to finish first, so Kazulin needed to finish last, if only so the Leader and/or his cohorts may sleep more peacefully at night.
--David Marples

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

Si?

Monday, July 17, 2006

Libano

Che dire della situazione in Libano?
Francamente da studente di scienze politiche capisco le necessità strategiche di Israele per perseguire la sua sicurezza nazionale. Paese storicamente circondato da paesi ostili, o una volta tali (Giordania, Egitto), e già abituato a subire una doppia offensiva "a tenaglia", per la quale rimane vivo il ricordo positivo della Guerra dei Sei Giorni. Nel momento in cui si avverte un'offensiva su due fronti, la risposta è sempre stata e forse non può che essere intensa (ed evidentemente violenta).
Ma da comune cittadino, e dal punto di vista di uno che non ha mai tralasciato di difendere Israele quando era necessario, vorrei fare qualche osservazione. Sui media e nelle piazze (anche in quelle virtuali, ovvero i blog) si discute se Israele abbia "il diritto di difendersi". Che ragionamento è? Mi pare evidente che Israele, come qualsiasi stato, ha il diritto di difendersi se aggredito! Discussioni di questo tipo lasciano evidentemente il tempo che trovano.
Mi sembra invece più opportuno valutare la faccenda in base alle sue implicazioni geopolitiche. Spesso chi è chiamato a formulare piani per la sicurezza nazionale di un paese non valuta la situazione a livello di stabilità regionale, o pensa che sia possibile garantire la propria sicurezza interna in un'area infiammata. Tradotto, la concezione di "sicurezza" che hanno i militari può discostarsi di molto da quella dei civili. Quel che è certo, è che condurre un bombardamento massiccio di questo tipo, senza palare delle vittime civili che ne conseguono, mi pare un modo piuttosto pericoloso di difendersi dai nemici esterni. Si fa poca distinzione, per non dire nessuna, tra governo libanese e Hezbollah (che, pur avendo un ministro nell'esecutivo, è ben lungi dall'occuparlo interamente), e si è avviata un'offensiva militare durissima senza neanche un ultimatum iniziale. Così facendo non si fa altro che indebolire la posizione del premier libanese. Male. Mi pare che demolire un paese fragile come il Libano (che aveva appena iniziato una ricostruzione dopo il dramma della guerra) sotto una pioggia di bombardamenti , con timidi tentativi di trascinare la Siria nella zuffa, siano un modo gratuito di esacerbare tensioni già aspre.
Per quel che riguarda lo scenario politico italiano, trovo vergognoso che a destra (ciò vale anche per la Bonino) si stigmatizzino tentativi di "mediare un conflitto", quasi che criticare una scelta di politica estera di Israele sia una cosa proibitissima o sinonimo di anti-sionismo. Se Israele sbaglia, o esagera, non vedo nulla di strano nel muovere critiche costruttive. E il diritto internazionale (che per ora non è stato violato) vale comunque tanto per lui quanto per gli altri stati. Non degno di attenzione le pulsioni della sinistra radicale.
In definitiva penso che sicuramente Israele abbia diritto di difendersi, ma non è questo il punto. Il nocciolo è che lo sta facendo in un modo molto pericoloso per i fragili equilibri regionali, e io ammonisco, che si cessino subito le ostilità. Da una situazione del genere il Libano non ne può uscire certamente rafforzaro, e con lui la stabilità del Medio Oriente.
Intanto a Parigi si esprime "solidarietà per il Libano" (per un retaggio coloniale di lunga data), Chirac da San Pietroburgo giudica "aberranti" le offensive israeliane, e De Villepin si reca addirittura a Beirut. Link & link.
Il mio soprannome non è un caso, personalmente apprezzo la storia francese e il suo sistema politico, nonchè i valori che porta avanti dall '89. Anche in questa occasione confesso di non sentirmi totalmente distante dalle parole di Parigi. Così come contestare la politica di Bush non vuol dire essere antiamericani (è un'accusa che non accetto, visto l'amore che ho per gli U.S.), criticare quella israeliana non vuol dire essere "nemici di Israele".
Il Cordigliere

Saturday, July 15, 2006

Manifesto for peace in Chechnya

Oggi c'è il G-8 riunito a San Pietroburgo. La più grande vergogna dell'Occidente illuminato e democratico sta per consumarsi al tavolo dei grandi potenti. Un atto di sottomissione al liberticidio e all'autoritarismo russo. Se ne poteva fare a meno. Comunque...
Son qui per diffondere il "Manifesto per la Pace" preparato da Akhmed Zakayev, ministro degli esteri della Chechen Republic of Ickeria già dai tempi di Maskhadov. Rifugiato politico a Londra e ospite di Vanessa Redgrave (che molto ha fatto per la causa cecena in questi anni), il suo impegno per sostenere la posizione laica e moderata di Maskhadov è stato ininterrotto.
Il Cordigliere personalmente non crede che con Mosca si possa negoziare, perchè non c'è la volontà da parte sua di rendere giustizia e di trovare un compromesso per entrambe le parti. Se ci fosse questa volontà, personaggi come Ramzan Kadyrov sarebbero già stati arrestati e condannato all'ergastolo per crimini di guerra. I gesti di buona volontà e apertura al dialogo da parte della guerriglia non si contano fin dal 1999, ed oggi, colui che più tiene alto in Occidente il ricordo di Maskhadov, rende pubblico un Manifesto per la pace, offrendo un ennesimo gesto di apertura, forse il massimo che si possa chiedere.
Temo fortemente che questo appello cadrà nel vuoto, come tutti quelli che l'hanno preceduto. L'Occidente così facendo darà l'ennesima prova di debolezza, aggravata dal fatto che questo sarebbe il periodo buono, essendo morto Basaev, ed essendo così venuto meno un ostacolo alla pace. Ma come dicevo, Basaev non è l'unico ostacolo. Manca ancora la buona fede e l'umiltà del Cremlino di riconoscere i propri errori. In assenza di questa apertura anche da parte russa non ci si può lamentare se la guerriglia andrà avanti ancora per molti anni.
Onore al Presidente Maskhadov e alla sua testimonianza di pace su questa terra.
Il Cordigliere
(Source: Chechenpress)
Manifesto for Peace in Chechnya

(This Manifesto has been written with the aim of attracting the attention of the World Leaders of the G-8 in view of their meeting in St. Petersburg mid July 2006)

Considering, that Russians and Chechens, during their shared history over the last four centuries, have been in an ongoing conflict, which has endangered the mere existence of the Chechen people through wars and deportations,
Considering that since the agreements in Moscow, Nasran and Khasavyourt – followed by the peace agreement of 12 May 1997 - ten years have passed - ten years during which resumed hostilities have caused the death of maybe a hundred thousand persons, forced an even greater number of refugees to leave the republic, brought further destruction of the material basis of society and made life for the remaining population extremely hard,
Considering, that the ongoing conflict has led to increasingly barbaric violations of human rights - torture, seductions, illegal imprisonments and terrorist acts - and has weakened or destroyed moral values in society; religious traditions have been undermined by the influence of foreign ideologies and youth has lost any perspective for a decent life in future,
Considering, that this conflict has serious effects on the entire region, destabilizes the whole of Northern Caucasus by aggravating ethnic conflicts and by jeopardizing its potential of becoming a prosperous zone where all different ethnic and religious groups could live together in peace,
Considering that the late President Maskhadov who had been elected in the free and fair elections, officially recognized by Moscow, has launched in early 2005 a substantial peace initiative, proposing unconditional talks with Moscow, and declared a one-sided one-month-ceasefire for the month of February 2005 – this initiative remained without any reaction from the Russian side and Maskhadov was killed on March 8, last year;

Today we declare that urgent action is needed for a peaceful solution of this conflict as the only way out for bringing stability and progress to the whole region. In this perspective we define our goals as follows:- To guarantee the security in the life of the people of Chechnya, the respect of human rights and of law,- To establish political power structures, based on free and fair elections,- To create the conditions for economic and social development for normalizing life and allowing the return of the refugees.

For achieving these goals our means are the following:- Our people have been fighting for defending independence during all these years through the first and the second war. In view of Russian aggression against our Republic, we always have considered independence as the fundamental means to achieve our goal of peace for the Chechen people and as guarantee for its security. However, if based on international law, any other solution for peace with the Russians can be found, for achieving the above mentioned goals, we are open for according negotiations. - Through our conflict with the Russians a lot of violence has been brought into our society, the consequences of which constitute a heavy burden for future internal peace. Therefore, all efforts for general conciliation and internal peace in Chechnya have to be brought about. For this not only amnesty measures are necessary but also means - like truth commissions – , with allow an active participation of the family members of the victims of violence.- For reconstruction of the Republic foreign assistance has to be mobilized.

We know that there is no solution of the conflict by continued warfare and violence. Therefore, we declare that negotiations with Russia have to start without preconditions. We condemn all forms of violence against the civilian population, including terrorist acts.
(Ahmed Zakayev, Foreign minister of the Chechen Republic of Ickeria 5 July 2006)

Tuesday, July 11, 2006

Вся правда о Шамиле

Il terrorista ceceno Shamil Basaev è morto in Inguscezia nella notte tra domenica e lunedì, in circostanze, come al solito, per nulla chiare. La notizia, prima diffusa dai servizi di sicurezza russi, è stata infine confermata dal Kavkaz Center.

Con Basaev, scompare un elemento dannoso per la pace nel Caucaso, ma di certo non l'ultimo (come Anna Zafesova ha impropriamente sostenuto oggi su La Stampa): fino a quando Putin porterà avanti la politica del pugno di ferro nel Caucaso settentrionale la stabilità è una parola priva di senso. Sicuramente il colpo inferto alla guerriglia cecena è pesante, ma ben lontano dall'indebolire una struttura militare abituata a individuare nuovi leader (quale quella cecena) e una rete di gruppi armati ribelli attivi in tutto il Caucaso settentrionale e perfettamente unificati sotto la bandiera verde dell'Islam. Basaev ne era il leader indiscusso (nel ruolo di Amir dei mujahedin del Caucaso settentrionale), e la sua morte più che essere un duro colpo lo renderà probabilmente un mito per le generazioni a venire, come il personaggio storico di cui porta il nome.

Shamil Basaev era, per sua stessa ammissione (fatto non di poco conto) un terrorista. Amante di Che Guevara, ex-venditore di computer, genitori uccisi in un bombardamento russo nel '95, ha passato i primi anni dell'epoca dudaevista (91-94) compiendo in prima persona atti di terrorismo(sabotaggi e, soprattutto, dirottamenti). Nel '92 ha combattuto in Abchazia con il supporto provato dei servizi di sicurezza russi: in quella sede sono stati aperti canali di contatto la cui interruzione purtroppo non è mai stata verificata. Nel '95 Basaev prese in ostaggio l'ospedale di Budennovsk riuscendo carambolescamente a rovesciare le sorti del primo conflitto, a vantaggio delle forze cecene: un centinaio di persone morirono in un tentativo goffo delle teste di cuoio russe di liberare gli ostaggi che solidarizzarono con il terrorista ceceno. Erano tempi completamenti diversi da quelli post-9/11. Alla fine della guerra Shamil Basaev diventa il principale rappresentante del cosiddetto wahhabismo in Cecenia (assieme a Zelimchan Jandarbev e a Movladi Udugov), rifiutando ogni tentativo del Presidente Maskhadov di cooptarlo in un governo di unità nazionale e, anzi, dichiarandogli guerra in diversi attentati falliti compiuti tra il '98 e il '99. Basaev è il principale artefice del fallimento del processo di state-building ceceno portato avanti dal Presidente Maskhadov: tuttavia sarebbe assurdo imputarne a lui tutta la colpa. Mosca tra il '98 e il '99 cercò in ogni modo di impedire al governo di Grozny di consolidarsi e di potersi avviare sulla strada di un'Indipendenza che, agli occhi dei ceceni, era stata conquistata col sangue, sul campo. In quegli anni caotici Basaev era probabilmente coinvolto nel business dei sequestri, che ha portato ingenti finanziamenti ai radicali ceceni, attraverso riscatti più consistenti del previsto puntualmente pagati dal "mediatore del Cremlino", il potentissimo oligarca Boris Berezovski (poi sottomesso da Putin e oggi rifugiato politico a Londra). Fonti autorevoli testimoniano come lo stesso Berezovski abbia finanziato l'invasione wahhabita del Dagestan, condotta da Basaev e al-Khattab nell'agosto del '99 e che ha di fatto aperto le operazioni militari poi sfociate nel secondo conflitto russo-ceceno[Sinatti 2000, Gabashvili, 2001].

Capire cosa stesse architettando Basaev tra il '98 e il '99 è un fatto decisivo, che va osservato parallelamente a ciò che stava avvenendo a Mosca. Prima del '99 erano gli oligarchi a imporre il loro peso sul Presidente Elstin', poi con Putin tutto è cambiato: gli oligarchi sono stati sottomessi (ponendo anche molti dubbi sull'effettivo liberalismo dell'economia di mercato russa), le regioni sono state private di ogni potere con un rigidissimo centralismo, gli organi di stampa sono stati quasi tutti posti sotto il controllo del Cremlino, alcuni oppositori hanno fatto una brutta fine.

Shamil Basaev aveva un suo piano, un piano completamente diverso da quello dell'indipendentismo ceceno. Basaev cercava una sua popolarità, e ha pensato di trovarla ponendosi come successore ideale dell'Imam Shamil', il leggendario capo àvaro che guidò la Grande Guerra del Caucaso contro lo Zar. Putin ha trovato un partner ideale in Basaev, ed è in quest'ottica che si collocano i misteriosi atti di terrorismo dell'estate '99 contro palazzi civili (attribuiti alla guerriglia cecena, ma di indubbia matrice stragista), preparati all'uopo per scatenare una seconda guerra in Cecenia [Sinatti 2000, Gabashvili 2001, Allaman 2003]. Vladimir Putin prima di diventare primo ministro nell'agosto del '99 era stato il direttore dell'FSB, disponendo dei mezzi ideali per preparare una strategia del terrore su larga scala. Putin intendeva infatti costruire la sua ascesa personale sulla guerra in Cecenia, e così è stato. Basaev sperava invece di approfittare di un rinnovamento del conflitto per accrescere la sua leadership, non tanto in Cecenia, quanto in tutto il Caucaso settentrionale. Utilizzando il pugno di ferro per reprimere pericoli che allora erano solo retorica, Putin ha creato il terrorismo islamico in Russia, auto-realizzando la minaccia sbandierata.

Basaev ha rivendicato vergognosi atti di terrorismo di matrice cecena (Dubrovka '02, Beslan '04), ma va precisato che Basaev ha rivendicato molti attentati (o opere di sabotaggio) di cui non era assolutamente responsabile, e di cui è stata accertata l'origine mafiosa o accidentale. Basaev intendeva portare avanti la spirale di violenza duettando con Putin. La cosa stava bene ad entrambi, Basaev non aveva alcun timore ad addossarsi il patrocinio di atti di terrorismo, anche se la vera dinamica di questi è spesso difficile da provare. I principali atti terroristici e, più recentemente, le uccisioni mirate dei leader ceceni (Maskhadov, Sadullaev, Basaev stesso), cadono infatti con un tempismo perfetto, questi impressionante, come se qualcuno, al Cremlino, stesse cercando di usare la questione cecena come un teatrino di marionette per rafforzare sempre più il potere personale di Putin. Ogni atto di terrorismo avviene, stranamente, in coincidenza con eventi importantissimi per la legittimazione internazionale della resistenza cecena, con il fine assai probabile di offuscare l'immagine della guerriglia cecena (e del ruolo di Maskhadov).

Non sapremo mai che legami c'è stato tra Basaev e i servizi di sicurezza. Sembrerebbe però, e la sua uccisione lo confermerebbe, che Basaev sia stato volutamente lasciato libero di agire, costantemente sorvegliato dai servizi di sicurezza. Insomma se ne sarebbero serviti fintanto che ne avevano bisogno - a detta di molti testimoni locali Basaev girava spesso in macchina spostandosi tra Cecenia e Inguscezia, e dove era il suo nascondiglio non sembra fosse un mistero. Non è un caso che Basaev sia morto solo ora, e dopo l'eliminazione di tutti i principali leader moderati. Oggi di Basaev non ce n'era più bisogno. Il tempismo è perfetto... a pochi giorni dall'inizio del G-8 che si terrà a San Pietroburgo, dove Putin potrà agevolemente vantarsi dei progressi fatti nella lotta al terrorismo. In ogni caso, anche se le circostanze esatte della morte non sono chiare (e non lo saranno mai), sembra che in ogni caso esse inchiodino comunque Mosca alle sue responsabilità. Basaev stava girando con un camion carico di tritolo in Inguscezia, con una scorta di 3 auto al seguito, in un'area teoricamente iper-controllata dalle forze federali russe. Che si sia trattato di incidente (non lo credo) o di una uccisione mirata ad opera dei servizi di sicurezza (ciò che penso corrisponda al vero) in ogni caso è la conferma che Basaev era LASCIATO LIBERO di girare liberamente fuori dalla Cecenia, e che solo adesso si è eliminato, perchè l'appuntamento del G-8 è un appuntamento troppo importante per Putin. La libertà con cui Basaev si spostava tra Balcaria, Inguscezia, Daghestan e Cecenia fa sorgere pesanti sospetti su eventuali collegamenti con i servizi di sicurezza, in un'area altamente militarizzata e costellata di posti di blocco.

Voglio chiarire che non è mai stato provato un collegamento tra Basaev e Bin Laden. Nè tra Al-Qaeda e la guerriglia radicale cecena. Si sono sentite molte speculazioni a riguardo, ma mai nessuna spiegazione chiara e argomentata. Opinione di chi Vi scrive è che Basaev fosse un retaggio del separatismo nazionalista, con una metastasi wahhabita che lo ha reso anche un prodotto del putinismo. Un problema non internazionale ma INTERNO della Russia. Non ho mai letto proclami attribuiti a Basaev in cui il nemico fosse l'Occidente o il "satana americano", ma sempre gli infedeli russi. Mosca afferma che il terrorismo ceceno è legato ad Al-Qaeda, e che quindi è un problema internazionale... salvo poi rifiutare ogni risoluzione collegiale del problema nascondendosi dietro i "la Cecenia è un problema interno nostro". Quale contraddizione!

La stessa favola del "piano per un attentato al G-8 " (che Basaev avrebbe voluto portare a termine) è pura propaganda del FSB. Dico, mi hanno preso per un deficiente? Questa favolta potrà funzionare con una vecchia babushka colcosiana, ma non certo con me.

Cosa accadrà d'ora in poi?

A mio avviso non ci sarà alcuno spazio per soluzioni politiche del conflitto, tantomeno ora. L'eliminazione di Basaev assesta un duro colpo alla guerriglia, anche se va precisato che l'impegno di Basaev in Cecenia negli ultimi tempi era fortemente limitato. Egli agiva principalemente fuori dalla repubblica, mantenendo vivi preziosissimi contatti tra le varie jama'at (comunità islamiche) delle repubbliche circostanti. In questo senso la morte di Basaev potrebbe indebolire l'attività di coordinamento della guerriglia caucasica. L'attuale Presidente separatista, Doku Umarov, non ha gli stessi contatti con l'estero di cui godeva Basaev, e questo potrebbe indebolire il coordinamento delle operazioni, nonchè l'egemonia (finora indiscussa) della guerriglia cecena. Dubito che scoppieranno feudi tra le varie guerriglie. L'Islam è un collante troppo forte nel Caucaso settentrionale. con Basaev muore un grande leader che diventa leggenda, ciò potrebbe addirittura dare nuovo slancio alle migliaia di giovani disoccupati ed emarginati da uno sviluppo malato. Non ci sono elementi per ritenere che la guerriglia caucasica cesserà di costituire la maggiore sfida all'assolutismo putiniano: ne è un prodotto e ne è la conseguenza logica.

Vorrei concludere questo lungo post con un'osservazione. La condanna morale di chi prepara atti di terrorismo contro civili è netta. Nulla può giustificare lo spargimento di sangue innocente. Ma Basaev era uno che aveva semplicemente deciso di rispondere a Putin con le sue stesse armi. Basaev rappresenta l'alter-ego di Putin nel Caucaso settentrionale: come il primo, anche questo è un terrorista che ha deciso di versare sangue civile e che ha scelto di piegare ogni anche minima simpatia separatista con uno spietato terrorismo di stato. Una condanna (necessaria) di Basaev non può dissociarsi da un rifiuto ancor più netto dell'operato di Vladimir Putin. Finchè sentirò ancora parole di ammirazione per Putin, mi rifiuto di discutere le strategie di lotta messe in atto dalla guerriglia caucasica.

Con la morte di Basaev (che tutti avremmo francamento voluto vedere ben prima) pare chiudersi completamente l'epoca del separatismo di origine dudaevista. Oggi rimane solo, sulle sue macerie, un Islam radicale che rappresenta l'unica speranza per molti. La storia insegna che l'eterna resistenza cecena contro i russi ha incontrato delle pause, prima di ricominciare più forte che prima. Ebbene, troppo sangue è scorso perchè in Cecenia si possano dimenticare le umiliazioni subite.

L'ultimo auspicio rimane quello che, a fronte di un'Europa sempre più viscidamente supina verso il nuovo imperialismo energetico russo, almeno a Washington si ritrovi la volontà di tutelare davvero la democrazia e i diritti umani. Non nelle parole, ma nei fatti. E' ora di capire che una sedicente "santa alleanza contro il terrorismo islamico" unifica, contro un nemico volatile e in modo assai improbabile, delle super-potenze intimamente nemiche e con interessi contrapposti. E' ora di riprendere coscienza che essere portatori e garanti di certi valori vuol dire trattare gli stati che questi violano come loro spetta. Non si possono tollerare sconti verso stati liberticidi come la Russia o la Cina. Anche se constato con rammarico come l'amministrazione Bush non abbia fatto in partenza i passi giusti in questa direzione.

Chiedo scusa ai lettori della lunghezza, ma la morte di Basaev è un fatto epocale.

Il Cordigliere